This paper addresses the dependability modeling of hardware and software fault-tolerant systems taking into account explicitly the interactions between the various components. It presents a framework for modeling these interactions based on Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPNs). The modeling approach is modular: the behavior of each component and each interaction is represented by its own GSPN, while the system model is obtained by composition of these GSPNs. The composition rules are defined and formalized through clear ident@cation of the interfaces between the component and the dependency nets. In addition to modularity, the formalism brings flexibility and re-usability. This approach is applied to a simple, but still representative, example.
Introduction
In the context of computer system dependability, the need for addressing simultaneously both hardware and software dependability aspects has now been recognized. However, even though a number of publications have been devoted to the dependability of combined hardware and software systems (see e.g. [5, 6, 13, 14] ), work on both aspects dealt with at the same time is not prevalent. Also, it is noteworthy that, when they are considered together for real-life systems, the interactions between the components are not usually modeled explicitly (see e.g. [15, 16, 201) . This paper addresses the dependability modeling of hardware and software fault-tolerant systems taking into account the interactions between the various components. These interactions result for example from components communications for functional purposes (i.e.-functional interactions), or from the structure of the system, mainly the distribution of software components onto the hardware components (i.e., structural interactions), or from fault tolerance and maintenance strategies (reconfiguration and maintenance interactions). They induce dependencies between at least two components that are usually stochastic in nature. As a result, system dependability cannot simply be obtained by combining the dependability of its components. An overall model accounting for these dependencies is thus needed. Our aim is to model explicitly these dependencies so as to quantify their influence on system dependability. This is of prime importance during the design of a new system or while upgrading an already existing one. The designer can make different assumptions about the interactions between the components and compare the dependability of the resulting alternative solutions through sensitivity studies. As the nature of interactions is strongly linked to the modeling level considered and the assumptions made at the considered level, it is not possible to model all the interactions that could take place for any fault-tolerant system. Rather, we define a framework for modeling these interactions in a systematic way and, more generally, we define a framework to build up the dependability model of a faulttolerant system explicitly taking into account these interactions. To do this, we follow a modular approach based on Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPNs) due to their ability to handle modularity and hierarchy. Note that modular approaches using GSPNs or their offsprings are widely used (see e.g., [2, 181 ). Our contribution lies in modeling the interactions between hardware and software components and giving a formal description of these dependencies.
The paper is organized in five sections: Section 2 presents the framework for modeling interactions between hardware and software components. Section 3 gives a formal description of the various types of dependency nets while Section 4 illustrates the approach on a duplex system with several interactions. Section 5 concludes.
. Modeling Framework
on the analysis of the system's behavior, dependencies between the components that could be induced by functional or structural interactions or by interactions due to system reconfiguration and maintenance. Some examples of dependencies due to these interactions are given in the following. Error propagation between two software components is an example of stochastic dependency resulting from functional interactions (exchange of data or transfer of intermediate results from one component to another).
The halting of the software activities following a permanent failure of the hosting hardware is an example of stochastic dependency induced by a structural interaction. Sharing of a single repairman by the two hardware computers leads to ii maintenance dependency whereas switching from an active component (hardware or software) to a spare component following a permanent failure of the active component leads to a reconfiguration dependency. In this paper, we consider interactions that are driven by events occurring in a component whose occurrence may impact the behavior of other components.
A high level model of the system is first derived based on the previous analysis. It is made of blocks and iul'ows: a block stands for the component model (component net) or a dependency model (dependency net), and an arrow shows the direction of the dependency. The system model is thus obtained by composition of the component and dependency models. In a second step, each block is replaced with its detailed GSPN. To allow for a systematic build up of dependency nets, rules that will have to be followed during model construction are defined. These rules manage the interfaces between the dependency and component nets and are prerequisite for modularity, hierarchical modeling and re-usability (re-usability is a valuable concept when it comes to doing sensitivity studies about certain assumptions regarding a system's behavior or when several alternative solutions are being considered). Also, these rules allow an easy validation of the global model. In the rest of the section, we give the characteristics of the component and dependency nets and present the various types of dependency nets together with the rules that have to be followed to build up the GSPNs.
Components nets: A component net represents the behavior of a component as resulting from the activation of faults in this component and the subsequent error processing, restarl or repair actions. The assumptions made and the degree of detail considered are usually guided by the interactions with other components one wants to exploit (such as the consequences of non detected errors or activation of temporary faults). A component net is designed to be a standalone net with its initial marking, it is live and bounded. It can be connected with dependency nets only following well defined rules as explained hereafter; connections must not alter the initial structure of the component nets.
Dependency nets: A dependency net is linked to at least two adjacent nets: an initializing and a target net that could be component or dependency nets. To formally describe dependency nets and to promote re-usability, we define as much common characteristics as possible. As a result, whatever is the kind of interaction modeled, all the dependency nets are initialized and interfaced with the adjacent nets following the same rules; they only differ in their effects on the target net. The common characteristics and the different effects on the target nets are introduced in figure 1 where a hypothetical dependency net with all types of effects is given (the notations are introduced with the formalism). They are summarized hereafter.
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Figure 1: Characteristics of dependency nets

Dependency net initialization
A dependency net is initialized through the marking of one or more entry places by the initializing net(s), following firing of initializing transitions in these initializing net(s) (as interactions are event driven). The initial marking of the entry places is zero. When the initializing net is a component net, the consequences of initializing transition( s) firing on the component behavior are rnodeled within the component net (marking of one or several internal places) and an additional token is generated and deposited in the entry place of the dependency net to activate the interaction. If the initializing net is a dependency net, the token deposited in the entry place could be either the one generated when entering the initializing dependency net (corresponding to a series of successive interactions) or an additional one newly generated (corresponding to the initialization in parallel of two or more interactions).
Internal transitions:
The dependency net has internal transitions (timed or instantaneous) whose firing may be independent from the marking of the adjacent nets (independent transitions) or conditioned by the marking of places in the adjacent nets. A condition is modeled by an inhibitor arc or an arc from and towards the tested place: the marking of this place is not changed. The interfaces with the adjacent nets (excluding initializing arcs and effects on the target nets) are thus only constituted by tests on the marking of specific places. An internal transition could be absorbing (i.e., the tokens are absorbed). -if the initializing net is a component net, the interaction consists in coordinating the component restart (or repair) action with the restart (or repair) action of the components to which it is linked: it requests permission before undertaking internal actions, these actions are enabled by the dependency net (immediately or after firing of internal transitions). The target net is necessarily the same as the initializing net. At the GSPN level, the effect consists of enabling a transition in the component net through the marking of a place in the dependency net. Since the component net is a standalone net, this means that, in the component net, this transition has also to be enabled by the marking of at least an internal place. This is an authorization net, -if the initializing net is a dependency net, the interaction consists in activating another interaction with other linked components; at the GSPN level, this consists of initializing another dependency net by depositing a token in its entry place following the firing of an initializing transition in the initializing dependency net. As previously stated, depending on whether the token deposited in the target net is an additional one, both dependency nets run in parallel or in series. This is an activation net. The previous rules are intended to manage the static
links between dependency and adjacent nets. Further rules have to be considered to control the dynamic behavior of the nets (i.e., the tokens generation and their flow). They are given together with the formalism in the next section. Note that model construction is an iterative process with information flow in both directions f r o d t o dependency nets to/from components nets: in the component models, care should be taken to include potential dependencies.
Interaction origin and dependency net type:
The interactions have been attributed to three possible origins: functional, structural and those due to system reconfiguration and maintenance. Functional and structural interactions are usually accompanied by a state change, the associated nets are thus action nets. Dependencies due to reconfiguration and maintenance may induce a state change and they could be any kind of dependency net.
Entry place (EP) of Nd.
Transition of Ni that initializes Nd by marking an EP Internal transitions: Internal transitions of a dependency net can be independent or conditioned by the marking of places in adjacent nets. They are defined as follows:
. Nets formalization and validation
ti, E Td is an independent transition if V p k such that tCk E Td is a Conditioned transition if the two following conditions are verified 1) 3pj E (P~uI:) such that:
An internal transition can be an absorption transition. An independent or a conditioned transition tij or tcj is an absorption transition if:
Action nets: An action net ends with a transition which causes a token to be removed from a stable place of the target net and to be returned to the same or another stable place of the same net. Removal and return can be done through two distinct transitions (with internal transitions and places between them) or through the same transition. The number of tokens in the target net remains unchanged. Transitions tuj and t u j are action transitions if the four following conditions are met:
2) 3 p k E P ' such that: Odg(tuj.,pk ) = 0 and Idg(pk, t u j ) > o(taj : removing transition) or: Dynamic behavior: The generation, moving and absorption of the tokens has to be controlled while building up a dependency net so as to ensure that the resulting global net is bounded and live. Each token, generated upon dependency net initialization by the marking of an entry place must thus be removed either in the dependency net itself or through the effect on the target net. It is then necessary that as long as a dependency net place is marked, whatever the global marking, there is a transition that can be fired and that removes a token from this place. This condition must be formalized for the internal places of all types of dependency nets.
Let py be such that Py = Pd for action and activation nets, pY = { P~ -pout} for authorization nets. The internal places and transitions of a dependency net must satisfy:
( 1 Every place has at least one transition that removes tokens: VPEP, 3tE;Td Iz(p,t)>O ando(t,p)=O If there exists an arc with multiplicity x from a place to a transition, there exist x-1 other arcs with multiplicity 1 to x-I, from the same place to x-1 other transitions with the same input and output as the preceding transition: VtET,, and PEP? with z(p,t)>O and O(r,p)=Oif 3p' E Pd such that I(p,t) = x, x E N then 3 x transitions t, ET, such that I(p' ,tj) = j , j = 1 ,..., x , I(p,tJ) > 0 and All these transitions are independent internal transitions. if there exists a test arc with multiplicity x between a place and a transition, there exist x-1 other arcs with multiplicity 1 to x-1, from the same place to x-1 other transitions with the same input and output as the preceding transition.
V P E pY and V P E pY with z(p,t) > O ando(t,p) =o, if ~P ' E P such that z(p',t)=o(t,p')=x, then 3 x transitions tl such that z(p',t,) = o(t,,p') = j , j = 1 ,..., x I(p,t,) >O 
. Application to the duplex system
with each replica, whereas the activation of permanent faults leads to restart the replica. To reduce system unavailability, after detection of an error due to a permanent fault in L, the software replicas switch their roles: processing is performed on the new leader before restarting the new follower. If L and F fail, L is restarted first. Also, in case of failure of the hardware hosting L (identified as Hl), the replicas switch their roles; the computer hosting the new follower is then repaired. With respect to hardware repair policy when the two computers are in failure, we consider two assumptions: R1: the two computers share a single repairman and priority of is given to H1 and R2: two repairmen are available.
High level modeling
Interactions are directly related to the assumptions made about the components' behavior. Owing to the importance of the impact of temporary faults on the behavior of hardware and software components [7, 8, 12, 191 , both permanent and temporary faults are considered in this example.
It is assumed that the activation of a fault may lead to the following dependencies:
Following activation of a hardware fault:
-an error due to the activation of a temporary fault in a hardware computer may propagate to the hosted software replica, -an error due to the activation of a permanent fault in a hardware computer leads to stopping the hosted software replica that is restarted after the end of hardware repair. Following activation of a software fault: owing to the notifications sent from the leader to the follower, an error in the leader due to a permanent fault -usually referred to as solid fault -may propagate to the follower (it is assumed that errors due to temporary faults -usually referred to as soft faults -are confined and do not propagate). Dependencies induced by fault tolerance and maintenance strategies are as follows:
Between software replicas: dependency due to fault tolerance of permanent software faults, i.e., reconfiguration from F to L. Between hardware computers: dependency due to reconfiguration and repair. Between all components: coordination of fault tolerance and maintenance actions to form a global recovery strategy when several components are in failure.
Let us consider a duplex system composed of two hardware computers (H1 and H2) and two identical software replicas: each replica is implemented on a computer. We assume semi-active replication [ 171: the leader replica (L) processes all input messages and provides output messages while the follower replica (F) does not produce output messages. The is updated by " n s of notifications from L completed by direct processing. Temporary faults in the software are tolerated by exception handling mechanisms associated These dependencies are summarized in table 2 together with the names of the associated nets which are used to build up the high level model of the duplex system. The latter is given in figure 2 where NHXd and Nsoft represent a computer and a software replica model respectively. The corresponding GSPNs are built up following the rules and formal description presented in Sections 2 and 3; they are successively given in the remainder of the section. Faults are activated with rate Ah. With probability Ph the fault is permanent, (probability of a temporary fault (1-ph)). The effects of an error due to a temporary fault are eliminated within a short time I/&, .
Hardware and software component nets
An error due to a permanent fault is either detected with probability dh, or non detected (I-dh); error processing rate: Th. The effects of a permanent, non detected error may be perceived later (perception rate h).
The repair rate including software restart (following detection or perception of an error) is p.
Equivalent assumptions are made regarding the behavior of the software replicas:
Faults are activated with rate &.
An error is either detected with probability ds, or non detected ( l-ds); detection rate z, . The detected error is processed by means of exception handling mechanisms during a short time 1hS. At the end of error processing, 1) if the fault is temporary (probability ( l-ps)) its effects are eliminated and the software resumes its normal mode of operation, 2) if the fault is permanent (probability ps); the software has to be restarted (rate: v) to eliminate its effects. The difference between these nets lies in that for hardware, temporary and permanent faults are differentiated by their respective consequences following activation, whereas for software, they can only be distinguished after specific processing [ 121.
Error propagation nets
From hardware to software: It is assumed that only undetected errors and those due to temporary faults can propagate from a hardware computer to the hosted software replica. The error propagation net, shown in figure 4, is initialized by the marking of place Prop following the firing of transition 1-dh (undetected error) or of transition l-ph (an error due to a temporary fault) in the hardware net (initializing net). With probability l-pph, the error is not propagated and with probability pph it is. Nprop is an action net, whose effects on the software net (target net) are as follows:
If the token is in S-ok, it is returned to S-e, the induced error is then processed in the same way as when the fault is activated without propagation (through h, in figure 3-b) . If the token is in S-e, since a fault is already activated in the software, the probability of error detection may be reduced (dsSd,), if the errors are detected, the token is returned to S-d; if they are non detected (with probability l-ds) the token is returned to S-nd. If the token is in S-nd (an internal error is non detected in the replica) the propagated error and the internal error are detected with probability d', (d',sld',, owing to the perturbation due to the fist error) the token is returned to S-d the errors remain undetected with 1-ds. If the token is in S-d the propagated error can compromise error processing and prevent the recovery of an error due to a temporary fault. The internal and propagated errors are recovered with probability 1 -pp If the token is in S-U, the software replica is already under restart, the token of Nprop is absorbed through tp-u and the token of Nsofi is kept in S-U.
(1-Pp < 1-Pd From L to F: The dependency net, the target net and the effects on the target net are exactly the same but the initializing net is that of the software leader. It is assumed that only undetected errors in L and detected errors of L due to permanent faults, can propagate. The error propagation net is then initialized following the firing of 1-d, or ps. The probability of error propagation is pps. At a higher modeling level, error propagation from L to F can be regarded as common mode failures.
Software stop and restart net
Following a detected error or the perception of an undetected error in an hardware computer, the hosted software replica is stopped and is restarted after repair of the hardware. We assume that the repair includes the replica restart. The software stop and restart net ( Figure 5 ) is an action net, it is initialized by the marking of STP following the firing of transition t h (perception of a non detected error due to a permanent fault) or dh (detection of an error due to a permanent fault). Transitions tl to t 5 remove the token from places S-ok, S-e, S-d, S-nd or S-U respectively. After repair of the hardware (including software restart), RST is marked and the token is returned to S-ok.
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Hardware reconfiguration and repair net
As previously stated, we consider two different assumptions: A1 assumes a single repairman, while A2 assumes the presence of two repairmen. The corresponding nets are given in figure 6 . Each net is composed of two parts corresponding respectively to reconfiguration (the shaded parts on the figures) and repair. They are grouped together because the reconfiguration is automatically followed by a repair. Since the reconfiguration strategy is the same, the associated nets are the same. The two nets are commented together and, when they are different, the figure number is specified. N R~~ is initialized by the marking of HIF (respectively H2F) following the firing of dh, detection of an error due to a permanent fault or c h perception of an undetected error, in the hardware hosting L, H1 (respectively H2):
if HIF is marked, H1 is in failure (HI is the initializer,
H2 the target):
-if H2 is not in failure (REP2 not marked) switching is 1) Switch can succeed with probability Ch, place attempted, (Ph) and HSW is marked:
SSW is then marked, 2) It can fail with probability l-Ch, FSW is marked and switching is done manually2 (Pm), SSW is then marked; tex can be fired, places EX1, EX2 and REP2 are marked; texl and tex2 can be fired, they remove the token from H-U to H-ok, and from H-ok to H-U, F becomes the new leader, L the new follower and it can be restarted (REP2 is marked in figure 6 -a for R1, H2F is marked in figure 6 -b for R2),
-for R1: if H2 is in failure (REP2 marked): t2h is fired removing the token from REP2 to 2HF; tr2 can then be fired returning a token in REP1 and one in H2F in order to repair H1, then H2, (for R2: if H2 is in failure (H2F marked): repair of H1 and H2 are enabled; at the end of H2 repair, if H1 is still under repair H2 is restarted with the leader), for R1 if H2F is marked: H2 is in failure (H2 is initializer and target): if H1 is not in failure (REP1 not marked), tf can be fired and REP2 is marked, authorizing the repair of H2; else the token stays in H2F until the end of H1 repair; repair of H2 in then allowed through the Other possible assumption: it can be assumed that the manual switch is not attempted. In this case, transition 1-ch leads to place 2HF (dashed arc in figure 6-a) ; place FSW and transition Pm have to be omitted. marking of REP2 (for R2: repair of H2 is enabled without any condition on Hl). For R1 and R2: if N R~~ is initialed by H1 only, its is an action, activation and an authorization net; when initialized by H2 only, it is an authorization net. If it is initialed by H1 then H2 (or H2 then H1) it is an authorization net.
Software reconfiguration net
The software reconfiguration net is given in figure 7. It is initialized by the marking of S1F (respectively S2F) following the firing of transition ps, a detected error due to a permanent fault or perception of an undetected error in L (respectively F):
if S 1F is marked, L is in failure (L is the initializer and 
Global recovery strategy net
The global recovery strategy net is initialized by 1vRep through FIH following the firing of tex. If F is in failure (RSTF marked) t2 removes the token from RSTF and deposits a token in RSTL and another one in S2F in order for L to be repaired first. If F is not in failure (RSTF not marked) transition tl deposits a token in CSW in order that the roles of the follower and leader to be exchanged. N,ytrat is an action net if place RSTF is marked and an activation net if RSTF is not marked.
be overcome by using an aggregation technique at the GSPN level to suppress immediate (see e.g. [ 11).
Considering again the duplex system, taking into account the fact that the transition rates associated with error detection and processing mechanisms are very high compared to failure, repair and restart rates (the durations of error detection and processing is of the order of the second whereas the intervals to failures are several hundreds of hours), the model can be reduced to 9 states as shown in figure 9 . This model is to be considered as a limiting case allowing verification of the complete model in this specific case. 
Concluding remarks and global model
Due to lack of space the formal description of the previous nets is not presented. It can be checked that the hardware and the software GSPNs are live and bounded. With respect to dependency nets, verification of these properties have to be done with the adjacent nets as indicated in figure 2, as follows NProp has to be validated connected with NHXd and Nsofi, (N' R, is identical to Nprop), NStop has to be validated with NHad and NSOR N R~~ has to be validated with two NHard, N R~~ has to be validated with Nsofi, Nstrat has to be validated with all the other nets (that have already been validated).
4.8.
The overall model obtained by replacing the blocks of figure 2 with their GSPNs given in figures 3 to 8 has been processed by SURF-2. The marking graph has 1200 markings and the Markov chain 500 states without any state aggregation due to symmetry.
It could be argued that the state space may be very large for more complex systems, this is inherent to the complexity of the system to be modeled and to the level of detail considered. The only difficulty due specifically to our modeling approach is the number of markings; it can 
. Conclusion
This work presented in this paper has allowed various types of dependencies between hardware and software components of a fault-tolerant system to be identified. These dependencies may result from functional or structural interactions as well as interactions due to reconfiguration and maintenance strategies. The dependability model of the system is obtained by composition of the components models with those associated with the dependencies. The rules for interfacing the models have been clearly defined and formally described to build up easily validable system models. The formal description facilitates the composition of the various GSPNs.
The modeling approach has been illustrated by a simple example, including all the types of dependencies identified: the duplex system. Modeling of this system showed the strong dependency between components. For example: the activation of a temporary hardware fault, may propagate an error to the hosted software component, which in tum may propagate to other components communicating with it (without being necessarily on the same computer). Thus the activation of a hardware fault, may lead to the restart of one or more software components. Even if this has already been observed on real-life systems, it has not been modeled explicitly in previous work. Also, we have shown how the modification of one or several assumptions can be performed without modifying all GSPNs, considering two repair policies and two switching policies (with or without manual switch).
The main advantage of the modeling approach, based on considering explicitly the interactions, lies in its efficiency for modeling several altematives for the same system These altematives may differ by their composition (number of computers or replicas) or the organization (distribution of software components onto the hardware) or by the fault tolerance and maintenance strategies. One can clearly identify from the beginning the components and interactions that are specific and those that are common to all altematives. The GSPNs that are common are thus developed and validated only once.
This approach has been applied to the French Air Traffic Control system (the subset associated with the Flight Plan Processing and Radar Data Processing) in [9] where twelve alteinative architectures have been modeled and their unavailability compared to identify the most suitable one. Based on these results, additional and more detailed architectures have been modeled in [4] . This application showed all the power of the modeling approach with the explicit modeling of the interactions.
